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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
I want to thank program planners for the opportunity to respond Dr. Bermejo-
Luque’s paper and also to thank Lilian for a very interesting and instructive essay. 
Regardless of some areas disagreement, I think Lilian would agree that presumption 
comprises a topic great importance to students of argumentation and, also, that it 
has received far too little careful attention. In what follows I will first offer an 
overview Lilian’s account; I will note a serious reservation, before turning what to 
what I take to be the major area in which we may disagree.  
  
2. BERMEJO-LUQUE’S ANALYSIS OF PRESUMPTION  
 
According to Lilian’s account presumptions are a kind of speech act on the order of 
constantives like assertions and promises. “Like assertions,” she writes 
presumptions may be correct or incorrect as speech acts, and it is their correctness 
condition as speech act what determines the semantic assessment of those pieces of 
argument that involve them.” In the interest of ultimately providing normative 
models for argumentation, Lilian gives priority to the questions, “. . . what is a 
presumption, and what makes a presumption correct? In this connection she 
distinguishes presumptions from presumptive inferences and offer correctness 
conditions for both. 
In response to the first question Lilian proposes that “a presumption is the 
speech act of putting forward a proposition as a reasonable assumption.” In this 
view a presumption will be correct, if the proposition put forward is a reasonable 
assumption. An assumption may be reasonable on both epistemic and pragmatic 
grounds. In turn, a presumptive inference, concluding in presumably that p, has a 
presumption as its warrant. Presumptive inferences, according to Lilian’s account, 
are valid (correct) “if the presumptions that constitute their warrants are correct 
presumptions. . . . And they will be good arguments if their reasons and warrants are 
both correct” (Bermejo-Luque, 2013). 
Lilian’s paper fits this analysis into her larger picture of arguments as second 
order speech acts. With that overall view in mind, she addresses several questions 
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regarding presumptions for which theorists have offered different answers. 
 
3. A PRELIMINARY RESERVATION 
 
Professor Bermejo-Luque and I share over-lapping interests and common concerns, 
but we approach study of presumptions from rather different perspectives. Both of 
us, it seems, suppose that students of argumentation ought to attend closely to the 
speech acts by means of which agents engage in arguments. Moreover, both of us 
are concerned with equipping argumentation studies with a sturdy armament for 
analysing and assessing arguments. But we approach these interests and concerns 
from somewhat different perspectives. Lillian works, we might say, from the top 
down. She has an apparently well-developed linguistic normative model for 
argumentation, LNMA, and her interest in presumption is explicitly directed to 
accounting for that practice, within her normative model for argumentation. I, on 
the other hand, approach study of presumptions more or less from the bottom-up. I 
start from the presumption, which animated the “discovery” of speech acts by 
Austin, Strawson, Grice, and others, that ordinary-day-to-day discursive practices 
rest on time-tested practical strategies which may need revision but which merit at 
least the supposition that they are coherent and productive (Austin, 1961; Grice, 
1989; Strawson, 1964) . Accordingly, I do not start from an abstract theoretical 
orientation to the study of presuming and presumption. My primary questions have 
been what are we doing when we presume things and what is that we take when we 
garner presumptions from this activity? Over the decades of working with pragma-
dialecticians, I have learned to respect and gain enlightenment from work animated 
by more abstract models, and I would not presume here on short notice to critique 
what seems to be a very interesting linguistic normative model for argumentation. 
Instead, I will express some reservations regard her account.. 
My first reservation focuses on the classification of presumptions as speech 
acts. Lillian is not alone in advancing this idea, and it has the theoretically motivated 
advantage of linking her work to various broader theories regarding speech acts. My 
immediate doubt focuses on whether presuming is properly and/or productively 
classified as a speech act. In J. L. Austin’s initial formulation of this term of art, and it 
will be recalled that Austin “discovered” this family, speech acts are performed in 
and by saying something or doing something which is the virtual equivalent of 
saying something (Austin, 1962). In promising, for example the speaker must (both 
conceptually and practically) say that she will do that which she promises to do (or 
produce a semantically equivalent utterance). Now, is possible to presume 
something in an utterance-act which explicitly involves a speaker’s saying that 
which she presume, e.g., “Dr. Livingston, I presume.” And we have forms of speech in 
which a supposition conforming to Lilian’s analysis can be presented in appropriate 
utterance, e.g., ‘It is reasonable to assume that p’. Still, I seriously doubt whether 
throughout our pervasive practice of presuming things, anything more than a very 
small proportion of such acts involve saying anything. You, for example, invite me to 
a reception; I enter the appropriate room, presuming that I will be welcome. There 
may be a conversational exchange affirming this presumption, but such exchange is 
not conceptually, and often would not be practically, necessary. Again, as a standing 
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presumption, we presume good will and proper regard from our fellows (Strawson, 
1968). These presumptions, integral to the texture of our day-to-day lives are apt to 
be articulated only when they are breached. 
Were we to seriously count presumptions as speech acts, we would populate 
our cognitive/discursive domain with a bewildering array of speech acts. Consider, 
if I seriously say and apparently mean that p, my utterance act warrants (other 
things being equal) the presumption that I am sincerely expressing beliefs the 
rational and empirical adequacy of which I have made a reasonable effort to 
ascertain. Do we want to say in this case that I have performed the act of seriously 
saying something and in the course of performing that act I have performed a 
second speech act of presuming something? The consequent multiplication of 
(redundant) acts of presuming in our social/cognitive space would simply be 
enormous. 
 
4. PRINCIPLE RESERVATION 
 
Lillian’s rather elegant conception of a correct presumption as a reasonable 
assumption has a certain theoretical appeal and, given the complexities of the 
relationships between assumptions and presumption in our ordinary cognitive 
scheme and corresponding practice, it has some plausibility as theoretical move. 
However, regarding her conception from the standpoint of what can be ascertained 
about our ordinary conceptions and practices of these two important activities, it 
seems to me that Lillian’s conception of their relationship may well confound the 
two to the detriment our capacity to critically evaluate relevant argumentation. 
As I have argued at some length elsewhere, from an ethno-methodological 
perspective, assuming and presuming are commonplace ways of taking something 
on the basis of reasons. They have this in common: both are taken on the basis of 
reasons which involve social considerations as well considerations related to the 
substantial basis for the inference. Thus, I presume that A will be home by seven on 
the grounds that A promised me to be home by that time; whereas, I might assume 
that A will return at that time because she normally does and no one, myself 
included has (so far as I can see) reason to suppose otherwise.1 Accordingly 
presumptions have strength and force; if A does not return by 7:00, she has some 
accounting to do. On the other hand, if I have merely assumed on the basis of past 
regularity that A will be back by seven, the responsibility for this error is mine, not 
hers. These differences between assuming and presuming ramify in somewhat 
ascertainable ways. 
Interesting differences also emerge when we consider the risks involved in 
assuming and presuming things. Assumptions may be safe or dangerous. We say 
'That's a safe assumption; everything argues for it, nothing against it’ or 'It's 
dangerous to assume that; this is a very controversial matter’. The risks involved in 
                                                        
1 Another similarity is that both assumptions and presumptions characteristically operate where 
more substantive reasons for accepting a proposition, when available, leave us less than certain. If 
the facts of the case provide good and sufficient reason to believe that p, there would be little call to 
assume or presume p. 
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making an assumption are run by the assumer. One may be justified or warranted in 
assuming that p, but an assumption is something one takes upon oneself in that 
typically one bears a singular responsibility for the adequacy of what one assumes. 
When a person presumes something, he or she characteristically takes it as 
something to which he or she is entitled. In this connection presumptions are 
subject to abuse in ways which assumptions are not. Where a person presumes 
something to which he or she is not entitled, his or her behaviour takes the form of a 
pretension; we describe it as “presumptuous,” using a disparaging sense of this 
term. Of such a person we ask, “Who does she think she is?” Assumptions are also 
subject to abuse, as when we speak of an arrogant assumption, but we do not have a 
concept of “assumptuous” behavior. 
Analysis shows that presumptions come to hand by virtue of reasons that 
have a rather definite form. The superior presumes that his subordinate will comply 
rather than risk reprobation for disobedience. Smith might presume upon his 
friendship with Jones by entering the latter's home, expecting Jones to acquiesce 
rather than suffer Smith's resentment upon being expelled. In each of these 
examples something is taken to be the case on the grounds that someone has or will 
have made that the case rather than risk resentment, criticism, reprobation, loss of 
esteem, or even punishment for failing to do so. Here we find the defining mark of 
presumption. We commonly use the expression 'He/she would not dare (do 
anything so outrageous as) . . . ' to frame presumptive inferences. 
Assumptions, on the other hand, are inferred on something like this basis: in 
the present circumstance p may (safely) be taken as being true because no relevant 
party is likely to raise compelling objections or doubts regarding p. Accordingly, we 
describe assumptions as suppositions which are taken for granted. To take 
something as being true is not to suppose that it is true; rather, it is to treat that 
proposition as true for purposes of the discussion, inquiry, decision, etc., even 
though it may not be known to be true and might even be known to be false 
(Kauffeld, 1995). 
My primary concern with Lilian’s account is that it blurs the difference 
between these related, but essentially distinction cognitive and discursive activities 
in ways which, where we to adopt her model and account as a primary matrix for 
argument evaluation, would blunt rather than sharpen our capacity for normative 
evaluation of arguments.   
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